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A B S T R A C T   
Behavioural economic theories of addiction contend that greater expected value of drug relative to alternative 
non-drug rewards is the core mechanism underpinning vulnerability to and recovery from addiction. To evaluate 
this claim, we exhaustively review studies with human drug users that have measured concurrent choice be-
tween drugs vs. alternative rewards, and explored individual differences. These studies show that drug choice 
can be modulated by drug cues, drug devaluation, imposition of costs/punishment and negative mood induction. 
Regarding individual differences, dependence severity was reliably associated with overall drug preference, and 
self-reported drug use to cope with negative affect was reliably associated with greater sensitivity to mood 
induced increases in drug choice. By contrast, there were no reliable individual differences in sensitivity to the 
effect of drug cues, drug devaluation or punishment on drug choice. These findings provide insight into the 
mechanisms that underpin vulnerability to dependence: vulnerability is conferred by greater relative value as-
cribed to drugs, and relative drug value is further augmented by negative affective states in those who report 
drug use coping motives. However, dependence does not appear to be characterised by abnormal cue-reactivity, 
habit learning or compulsion. We then briefly review emerging literature which demonstrates that therapeutic 
interventions and recovery from addiction might be attributed to changes in the expected relative value of drug 
versus alternative rewards. Finally, we outline a speculative computational account of the distortions in deci-
sion-making that precede action selection in addiction, and we explain how this account provides a blueprint for 
future research on the determinants of drug choice, and mechanisms of treatment and recovery from addiction. 
We conclude that a unified economic decision-making account of addiction has great promise in reconciling 
diverse addiction theories, and neuropsychological evaluation of the underlying decision mechanisms is a 
fruitful area for future research and treatment.   
1. Reconciling relative value and dual-process theories of 
addiction 
Behavioural economic theories of addiction contend that the re-
lative value of drug compared to non-drug rewards is a core mechanism 
underpinning drug dependence [1–11]. Although most theories accept 
that the drug’s relative reward value plays a role, particularly in re-
creational or initial use, many theories go on to postulate a secondary 
process that overrides or summates with reward learning to create the 
‘addicted’ state. One of the earliest dual-process models was negative 
reinforcement theory, which claims that growth in the withdrawal 
syndrome, psychiatric symptoms or negative affect further motivates 
drug use in order to alleviate these states [12]. Cue-reactivity theories 
inspired by associative learning contend that through Pavlovian 
conditioning, drug associated cues become capable of eliciting drug- 
seeking automatically [13] or via an expectancy of drug availability 
[14]. Relatedly, habit theories of addiction argue that drug reinforce-
ment stamps in strong S-R associations such that drug related stimuli 
(S) elicit drug-seeking responses (R) autonomously, i.e. without fore-
thought of the consequences [15,16]. Compulsion theories go further 
and claim that S-R associations become maladaptive (fixed) such that 
they can no longer be modified by direct experience of punishment or 
harmful consequences (unlike habitual S-R/reinforcement learning 
which can be modified by experience of changed outcome value) [17]. 
Finally, neurocognitive accounts argue that chronic drug use produces 
structural and functional brain changes [18] and thus cognitive deficits 
[19], including impaired inhibitory control [20] and impaired foresight 
of future rewards and costs [21], rendering drug-seeking less 
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susceptible to change by decision making. 
Unified economic decision making accounts of addiction have at-
tempted to reconcile these competing theories by suggesting that all of 
the secondary processes might promote drug-seeking via their impact 
on the expected relative value of the drug compared to competing non- 
drug alternative rewards, that is, by biasing preferential choice towards 
drugs [5,6,10,22,23]. On this view, addiction is driven by a single 
process – the relative expected value ascribed to the drug versus to non- 
drug rewards – but this process can be influenced by a multitude of 
factors. Although this unified decision framework has an attractive 
breadth of explanatory power, because predictions derived from all 
theoretical models can be incorporated into one, it remains to be seen 
whether the unified account can be justified with evidence. 
The current article evaluates the unified economic decision model of 
addiction in three sections, before outlining future directions. First, we 
consider whether the relative value of drugs vs. alternatives can explain 
vulnerability to dependence. An exhaustive review is provided of 
human concurrent choice studies which have tested whether choice 
between drugs vs. alternative rewards can be modified by experimental 
manipulations (cues, devaluation, costs and negative affect) and whe-
ther these effects are associated with self-reported dependence severity 
and associated risk factors (psychiatric symptoms and drug use to cope 
with negative affect). This work indicates that dependence severity is 
reliably associated with greater relative drug value (preferential drug 
choice), and drug use to cope with negative affect is reliably associated 
with greater sensitivity to negative affect induced increases in relative 
drug value, suggesting at least two risk pathways converging on relative 
drug value. In the remainder of the paper we offer a brief overview of 
emerging research findings which demonstrate that recovery from ad-
diction might be explained by changes in the relative value of the drug 
versus alternative rewards. Finally, we outline a speculative computa-
tional account that describes the internal processes that underlie va-
luation of drug and alternative rewards as a precursor to behavioural 
choice. Overall, we believe that the unified economic decision-making 
account has great promise in explaining both vulnerability to and re-
covery from addiction, and that neuropsychological evaluation of the 
underlying decision mechanisms would be a fruitful area for future 
research. 
2. Relative value of drugs versus alternative rewards underpins 
vulnerability to dependence 
Evidence that addiction is driven by expected relative drug value 
comes from the finding that dependence severity in humans, assessed 
by questionnaires or diagnostic criteria, is reliably associated with 
greater economic demand for drugs. In economic demand tasks, parti-
cipants report their hypothetical consumption of a drug across a range 
of prices, indexing the relative value of the drug compared to money 
(money is exchangeable for most rewards). This index of drug value has 
been shown to correlate with dependence severity in 41 studies on al-
cohol demand, 34 studies on nicotine demand and 10 studies on other 
substance demand, in both clinical and non-clinical samples [3,24]. 
Although these associations are largely cross sectional, they never-
theless provide compelling evidence supporting the claim that human 
drug dependence severity is underpinned by greater relative value as-
cribed to the drug compared to alternative rewards. 
Human concurrent choice tasks have also indexed the value as-
cribed to drugs relative to money and other rewards (e.g. food). In the 
concurrent choice task, participants make a choice between the drug 
and another reward across a series of trials, and the proportion of drug 
choices indexes the relative value of the drug versus the alternative 
reward [7,25]. Choices may earn points for their respective rewards in a 
token economy, or pictures of the rewards (reviewed in Tables 1–3). 
Actual consumption of chosen rewards has sometimes been arranged, 
but individual differences analysis has not been undertaken in such 
studies, perhaps because of the complexity and low throughput of the 
method [26–32] but see [33]. Finally, animal concurrent choice pro-
cedures have also been used to study the neuropsychological basis of 
relative drug value [34]. 
Table 1 lists 27 studies which tested whether dependence severity 
within a drug user group was associated with preferential choice of a 
drug versus alternative reward in a concurrent choice task, to test the 
economic decision model of dependence. As shown in column 5, in all 
27 studies, dependence severity within the user group was significantly 
associated with greater drug choice, suggesting dependence is under-
pinned by greater relative value of the drug versus alternative reward. 
Examination of column 2 indicates that this association has been found 
with different samples, including student, community and treatment- 
seeking users of different drug classes including alcohol, tobacco and 
cocaine. The association has also been found when using token 
economy and pictorial concurrent choice tasks suggesting both versions 
are sensitive to individual differences in drug value (column 4). The 
robustness of the association between dependence severity and drug 
choice across multiple designs and samples suggests that greater re-
lative drug value may underpin dependence universally, consistent the 
economic demand task, and with the economic decision model. 
Table 1 columns 6–9 list studies which tested the impact of an ex-
perimental manipulation (drug cues, outcome devaluation, costs, and 
negative mood induction) on drug choice, to determine if dependence 
severity was associated with sensitivity to these manipulations (for a 
meta-analysis of experimental manipulations impacting drug demand 
metrics see [35]). The studies in column 6 tested the prediction of cue- 
reactivity theory, that dependence would be associated with greater 
sensitivity to cue-induced increases in drug choice. The studies in 
column 6 demonstrated that presentation of drug related pictorial cues 
can increase drug choice compared to intermixed no-cue control trials 
in the Pavlovian to Instrumental Transfer (PIT) procedure [36]. The PIT 
test phase is designed to isolate the specific mechanism by which drug 
stimuli prime drug choice. In the test trials, the drug stimulus is pre-
sented for the first time while the two responses are available, and the 
test is conducted in extinction, where responses no longer earn their 
rewards. This design ensures that drug stimuli can only prime drug 
choice via an expectation (or inference) that drug response is more 
viable in the presence of the drug stimulus. The drug stimulus cannot 
prime drug choice through an S-R association because the stimulus has 
never previously been paired with the response, and testing in extinc-
tion ensures that this pairing is not reinforced during the test phase 
[37]. Consistent with this expectancy account, the drug PIT effect in-
creases with participants’ beliefs that drug cues signal a greater prob-
ability of the drug choice being rewarded, and can be abolished by 
instructions which contradict this belief [14,38,39]. These findings 
suggests that drug cues modulate the expected (verbalizable) prob-
ability that the drug choice will produce the drug, which increases the 
likelihood of selecting the drug choice, consistent with prospect theory 
and other decision models that envisage a role for expected response- 
reward probabilities in action selection [37,40]. Crucially for cue-re-
activity theory, however, as summarised in Table 1 column 6, depen-
dence severity was not associated with a greater drug PIT effect in all 
seven studies. Each of these studies demonstrated a significant drug PIT 
effect (i.e. the drug cue increased drug choice relative to no cue trials), 
but the magnitude of the PIT effect was not correlated with dependence 
severity in any of these studies. A related set of findings have been 
reported with the cue-induced craving model, where drug cues have 
been shown to increase self-reported (verbalised) desire for the drug to 
the extent that those cues signal the probability that drug choice will 
produce the drug [41]. Again, however, cue induced increases in sub-
jective craving are not reliably associated with dependence severity 
[42,43]. The conclusion, therefore, is that drug cues increase drug 
choice by raising the expected probability of receiving the drug (con-
sistent with the unified decision making model), but sensitivity to this 
effect does not appear to play a role in vulnerability to dependence, an 
observation that contradicts cue-reactivity theory of dependence. This 
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conclusion is supported by animal studies [44]. 
Table 1 column 7 lists studies which have measured the impact of 
drug devaluation on drug choice, to test habit theory of addiction. In 
these designs, baseline drug choice was first measured using a con-
current choice token economy procedure. Then, the drug or alternative 
reward was devalued by specific satiety, taste adulteration or health 
warnings. Finally, choice was measured again, but in extinction where 
the responses no longer earned their rewards such that choice could not 
be modified by direct experience of the rewards during the test. In the 
studies listed, drug devaluation reduced drug choice in the extinction 
test, demonstrating that drug choice is goal-directed in being controlled 
by an expectation of the current value of the drug plus knowledge of the 
response-outcome contingencies [45]. Stated another way, in the ab-
sence of feedback from outcomes earned in the extinction test, there is 
nothing to guide choice other than expectations about the current value 
of the outcomes previously earned by each response. Habit theory 
predicts that dependence should be associated with insensitivity to drug 
devaluation, because drug choice is controlled by an autonomous S-R 
association established in initial training, rather than by an expectation 
of current value of the drug [16], such that devaluation should produce 
no change in drug choice in the extinction test. However, in all four 
studies that tested this prediction, dependence severity was not asso-
ciated with insensitivity to the devaluation effect, contradicting habit 
theory. In the one study which did show a significant association [46], 
the devaluation treatment was 1 mg of intra nasal nicotine replacement 
therapy (NRT), which produced a significant increase in goal-directed 
tobacco choice in more dependent smokers (i.e. a priming effect), and 
produced a significant decrease in goal-directed tobacco choice in less 
dependent smokers (i.e. a satiety effect). This finding contradicts habit 
theory which predicts insensitivity to devaluation treatment in more 
dependent individuals. On the basis of these outcome devaluation stu-
dies, human dependence severity does not appear to be associated with 
a propensity to habit learning (insensitivity to drug devaluation). Other 
studies not included in Table 1, which tested whether drug users versus 
non-user control participants differed in their sensitivity to devaluation 
manipulations have similarly failed to find any consistent group dif-
ference, again providing little or no evidence for habit theory 
[22,47–49]. 
Table 1 column 8 lists studies that measured the impact of imposing 
costs on drug choice, to test compulsion theory. In these designs, 
baseline drug choice was measured, and then a cost was imposed on the 
drug choice in test trials, either by increasing the number of responses 
needed to obtain the drug reward (extinction), adding a delay between 
the response and receipt of the drug reward, or by increasing the value 
of the alternative natural reward that would be missed as a consequence 
of choosing the drug (opportunity costs). Although these types of costs 
are qualitatively different (and are grouped together largely for con-
venience), in each study, the imposition of costs significantly reduced 
drug choice, indicating that drug choice is an economic decision based 
on a rational evaluation of the payoff [50]. Most importantly, depen-
dence severity was not associated with impaired sensitivity to the im-
pact of costs on drug choice in three out of four of the studies, providing 
no evidence for compulsion theory. In the one study which found a 
significant association [33], increasing the value of the money alter-
native decreased tobacco choice more steeply as a function of tobacco 
dependence severity (converse to the prediction of compulsion theory), 
due to more dependent smokers choosing tobacco more frequently 
when the value of money was low. Thus, these concurrent choice stu-
dies contradict the prediction of compulsion theory that dependence is 
driven by a maladaptive S-R association that renders drug-seeking in-
vulnerable to immediate punishment [17] (for a more extensive cri-
tique of compulsion theory see [22,51]). It is interesting to note that 
other studies that tested the impact of imagined next day responsi-
bilities on measures of drug demand (willingness to pay for the drug), 
found evidence that dependence may be linked to insensitivity to these 
future costs [52–55]. Thus, dependence may be linked to an inability to 
incorporate future costs into decision making consistent with delay 
discounting models of addiction [21], but there is little evidence that 
dependence is linked to insensitivity to immediate costs, an observation 
that is inconsistent with compulsion theory [17]. Future work might 
test this prediction by contrasting the effect of immediate versus ima-
gined future costs on concurrent drug choice to determine whether 
dependence is uniquely associated with reduced sensitivity to imagined 
future costs. 
Finally, Table 1 column 9 lists studies which measured the impact of 
negative mood induction (sadness or stress) on drug choice to test ne-
gative reinforcement theory. In these studies, drug choice was mea-
sured in baseline trials, and then negative affect was induced across a 
test block, or acutely primed in intermixed test trials. In each study, 
mood induction increased drug choice indicating that mood induction 
Table 3 
List of studies that used concurrent choice tasks to measure the preference between a drug versus an alternative reward in a drug user sample, and tested whether self- 
reported drug use to cope with negative affect is associated with drug choice in a baseline condition (column 5), and/or with the increase in drug choice produced by 
negative mood induction relative to baseline or intermixed control trials (column 6), to test negative reinforcement theory. For notations see the caption for Table 1.        
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Paper Sample Sample size Choice task Association between drug use to cope with negative 
affect & preferential choice of drug vs. alternative 
reward 
Association between drug use to cope with negative 
affect & mood induced increase in drug choice  
[56] Student drinkers 128 TE r = .22, p = .01 F = 7.33, p = .008 
[70] Student drinkers 128 PC r = .31, p = .001 r = .25, p = .007 
[68] Student drinkers 192 PC r = 0.37, p < .001 r = 0.19, p = .007 
[84] Opiate dependent 46 PC r = .20, p = .18 r = .29, p < .05 
[67] E1a Student drinkers 127 PC r = .27, p = .003 x2 = 9.37, p = .002 
[67] E1b Student drinkers 127 PC r = .22, p = .01 x2 = 10.93, p = .001 
[67] E2 Hazardous community 
drinkers 
60 PC r = .45, p < .0001 x2 = 8.84, p = .003 
[81] E1 Student smokers 42 PC r = .57, p < .001 r=-.25, p = .11 
[81] E2 Student smokers 55 PC p = .09 F = 6.54, p = .01 
[81] E3 Community smokers 218 PC b = .23, p = .001 – 
[69] Hazardous community 
drinkers 
48 PC r = .46, p = .001 r = .13, p = .37 
[72] Treatment-seeking 
smokers 
207 PC r = .22, p < .01 – 
[7] E1 Treatment-seeking 
smokers 
33 PC r = .41, p = .02 – 
[7] E2 Treatment-seeking 
drinkers 
48 PC r = .49, p < .001 – 
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preferentially raised the value of the drug versus alternative reward. 
Importantly, mood induction can prime drug choice in the extinction 
test, indicating that negative mood raises expected drug value driving 
increased goal-directed drug choice [56,57]. Furthermore, mood in-
duction can fully countermand the effects of drug devaluation (by 
specific satiety) on goal-directed drug choice [57] suggesting the two 
motivational states have opposite effects on expected drug value, and 
that mood induction is more powerful than satiety – a primary moti-
vational state. The most important observation, however, is that de-
pendence severity was associated with greater sensitivity to mood in-
duced increases in drug choice in four out of the eight studies that 
investigated this, as summarised in Table 1 Column 9. Although this 
association was only demonstrated in half of the studies that tested it, 
the positive studies provide initial support for the claim of negative 
reinforcement theory that sensitivity to negative mood induced drug 
choice plays a role in vulnerability to dependence [58–60]. To explore 
this further, the next two tables examine whether sensitivity to mood 
induced drug choice is more closely associated with psychiatric symp-
toms and self-reported drug use to cope with negative affect. 
Negative reinforcement theory predicts that substance users who 
have psychiatric symptoms should ascribe greater relative value to the 
drug (i.e. show greater baseline drug choice) and should be more sen-
sitive to acute negative mood induced increases in drug choice (because 
these individuals have learned that the drug mitigates psychiatric 
symptoms and acute negative affect) [58]. Table 2 Column 6 sum-
marises studies which have tested whether psychiatric symptom se-
verity (depression and anxiety) within a drug user group is associated 
with preferential drug choice in a concurrent choice task. As shown, 
psychiatric symptoms were associated with baseline drug choice in 
eight out of 18 tests. The association appears to be weak in students (2/ 
9 positive), but stronger in community/treatment-seeking samples (6/9 
positive) especially if they are drinkers (5/5 positive) but not smokers 
(1/4 positive). It may be that psychiatric symptoms only promote drug 
choice beyond a certain level of symptom severity (i.e. the relationship 
is non-linear), or period of learning has passed (age dependency), or 
students may have protective factors. There may also be differences 
between drug classes. Isolating these potential moderators of the as-
sociation will require further studies and meta-analysis to uncover. 
Table 2 Column 7 summarises studies which have tested whether 
psychiatric symptoms are associated with greater sensitivity to negative 
mood induced increases in drug choice. This association was found in 
only three out of 13 tests, suggesting the associations may only be found 
under specific conditions – but the moderating variables are far from 
obvious. One possibility is that the association may be found when the 
negative state induced experimentally is relevant to the sample’s unique 
psychiatric symptom profile. In one study with adult daytime pub 
drinkers, a noise stress induced increase in alcohol choice was asso-
ciated with depression marginally, but anxiety significantly, and this 
association survived when controlling for depression, suggesting a un-
ique association between stress induction and anxiety [67]. Conversely, 
an association has been found between sadness induced drug choice 
and depression in smokers preselected with low versus high depression 
symptoms [77] and in students drinkers [70], suggesting there may a 
unique association between sadness induction and depression. There 
remains the question of why similar studies failed to find such asso-
ciations. There may be other factors such as the questionnaires used to 
assess psychiatric symptoms (i.e. whether they are sensitive in student 
and clinical samples, or tap the correct construct), as well as possible 
randomness in sampling resulting in different levels of symptom se-
verity between studies. Our working hypothesis is that future work 
might benefit from exploring the unique associations between specific 
psychiatric symptoms and specific experimental mood induction pro-
tocols [67,78–80]. 
Negative reinforcement theory predicts that substance users who 
report using substances to cope with negative affect should ascribe 
greater relative value to the drug (i.e. show greater baseline drug 
choice) and should be more sensitive to acute negative mood induced 
increases in drug choice (because these individuals have learned, and 
verbally report, that the drug mitigates negative affect) [22]. Although 
self-reported substance use to cope with negative affect is closely as-
sociated with psychiatric symptoms, coping motives are thought to 
proximally mediate drug consumption decisions [82,83]. If this is true, 
we would expect coping motives to be more reliably associated with 
drug choice, and negative mood induced drug choice, than psychiatric 
symptoms. Consistent with this view, Table 3 Column 5 shows that 12 
out of 14 studies found that coping motives were associated with drug 
choice, and the two nonsignificant associations were marginal, giving a 
higher ratio of positive findings than psychiatric symptoms. Further-
more, as shown in Table 3 Column 6, coping motives were associated 
with negative mood induced drug choice in eight of the 10 studies, 
again demonstrating a more replicable association than was found with 
psychiatric symptoms. These associations were not only reliable, but 
also generalizable in being found across drug classes (alcohol, tobacco, 
opiates), with student, community and treatment-seeking samples, and 
with different choice protocols (token economy and pictorial choice). 
These findings strongly suggest that substance use coping motives are a 
risk factor for greater drug value, and greater sensitivity to mood in-
duced increases in drug value. 
A key study indicates that negative mood induced drug choice is 
goal-directed, i.e. driven by an increase in expected drug value [56]. 
This study found that negative mood statements versus randomly in-
termixed neutral statements primed alcohol over food choice when 
these statements were presented for the first time in an extinction test 
(i.e. where the responses no longer earned their rewards). This effect is 
most feasibly explained by suggesting that negative mood statements 
acutely retrieved an expectancy (or inference) that the alcohol reward 
currently has a higher value, which augmented goal-directed alcohol 
choice. The effect cannot be readily explained by S-R or other automatic 
priming theories because the negative mood statements had never been 
directly paired with alcohol response, and this pairing was not re-
warded during the extinction test, so no S-R association could form (see 
also [57]). Crucially, the effect was more pronounced in individuals 
who reported alcohol use to cope with negative affect, indicating that 
negative affect raises expected drug value promoting goal-directed drug 
choice to a greater extent in these individuals. This is precisely the sort 
of risk pathway that would be anticipated by a unification of economic 
decision and negative reinforcement theories of addiction. 
The human concurrent choice findings reviewed above provide in-
sight into the type of unified economic decision theory that might ex-
plain vulnerability to addiction. Our observations were that drug choice 
could be modified by a variety of distinct decision variables, namely 
drug cues, drug devaluation, costs (response requirements, delay and 
opportunity costs), and negative mood induction (stress and sadness). 
Indeed, two of these decision variables – devaluation and negative 
mood induction – were shown to have opposing effects on drug choice 
when compounded, demonstrating a convergence of decision variables 
on behaviour [57]. More work is needed to test additive and subtractive 
effects of compounding decision variables on drug choice to establish 
the weight assigned to each decision variable [85]. Crucially, choice 
between the drug and alternative was demonstrated to be goal-directed, 
that is, controlled by an expectation of the drug, rather than determined 
by an S-R association or other automatic process. Drug cue priming of 
drug choice, devaluation induced decreases in drug choice, and nega-
tive mood induced increases in drug choice were all shown to be driven 
by changed expectations about the drug (in the extinction test of the 
outcome devaluation/revaluation procedure [86]). The implication is 
that drug choice is controlled by expectations about the drug’s value in 
the context of the individual’s current internal state, expectations about 
the probability of the response-reward contingency being in force given 
the external stimulus context, and expectations of the costs/risks arising 
from the drug choice. The convergence of these multiple distinct de-
cision variables on drug expectancy may be the mechanism by which 
L. Hogarth and M. Field   Behavioural Brain Research 394 (2020) 112815
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these factors are combined (commensurated) into a common neural 
currency to impact drug choice behaviour [87,88]. 
Fig. 1 summarises our conclusions about individual differences in 
sensitivity to decision variables influencing drug choice drawn from  
Tables 1–3. The first observation is that dependence severity was re-
liably associated with preferential drug choice in all 27 studies that 
investigated this. Fig. 1A provides one example of this association. 
Dependent individuals might choose the drug more frequently because 
they hyper-value the drug or hypo-value the alternative rewards, or 
both, but either way, they ascribe greater relative value to the drug. The 
addition of 85 studies showing that dependence is correlated with 
greater economic demand for drugs provides additional compelling 
evidence that dependence is driven by greater relative drug value. 
The second observation is the absence of an association between 
dependence severity and drug cue priming of drug choice in all seven 
studies that investigated this. Fig. 1A provides one example finding 
[14]. The drug cue raised drug choice overall, i.e. a main effect between 
slopes. However, there was no interaction between dependence severity 
and the slopes, indicating that more dependent individuals are not more 
sensitive to drug cue priming of drug choice, contradicting cue-re-
activity theories of dependence. The same was true regarding the effect 
of devaluation – dependence severity was not associated with in-
sensitivity to devaluation in all four studies that tested this, contra-
dicting habit theory. Similarly, dependence severity was not associated 
with insensitivity to direct costs imposed on the drug choice in all four 
studies that tested this, contradicting compulsion theory. These null 
associations can be seen in Fig. 1B [64] and C [65], where there were 
main effects between slopes, indicating that devaluation and imposition 
of costs reduced drug choice. However, there were no reliable inter-
actions, indicating that dependence was not associated with differential 
sensitivity to devaluation and costs, contradicting habit and compulsion 
theories, respectively. 
By contrast, mood induced increases in drug choice was more re-
liably associated with individual differences. Mood induced drug choice 
was associated with dependence severity in four of the seven studies 
that investigated this, with psychiatric symptoms in three out of 13 tests 
of this association, and with self-reported drug use to cope with nega-
tive affect in eight out of 10 studies. Examples of these associations are 
shown in Fig. 1D-F [67,70,77]), where there was an interaction be-
tween slopes indicating differential sensitivity to negative mood in-
duced drug choice across the individual difference factor. Mood in-
duced drug choice was more replicably associated with coping motives 
than with dependence severity or psychiatric symptoms, suggesting 
that coping motives is the most proximal determinant of this sensitivity. 
A related conclusion can be drawn from mediation analyses of survey 
data (Reviewed in [22] and [83]). These mediation studies show that 
multiple adverse states (including, stress, depression, anxiety, financial 
strain, antisocial behavior, bullying, intimate partner violence, intimate 
partner sexual coercion, childhood physical/sexual/emotional abuse, 
childhood trauma and adult trauma) are all associated with dependence 
severity, and this relationship is mediated by self-reported use of drugs 
to cope with negative affect. The implication is that coping motives 
underpin dependence in those who have suffered adversity. Our overall 
conclusion is that vulnerability to dependence is driven by individuals 
ascribing greater expected relative value to the drug driving greater 
goal-directed drug choice, and there is an additional risk pathway for 
individuals who develop drug use coping motives (as a result of ad-
versity), which confers sensitivity to negative affective states further 
raising expected relative drug value, promoting even greater goal-di-
rected drug choice. By contrast, vulnerability to dependence is not 
driven by greater sensitivity to cue-induced drug choice (cue-re-
activity), insensitivity to devaluation (habit learning) or insensitivity to 
costs imposed on drug choice (compulsion). 
Fig. 1. Figure 1 shows the regression slopes relating percent choice of the drug versus alternative reward as a function of three individual difference factors – 
dependence, depression and drug use coping motives – measured under baseline conditions (black line) and test conditions (dashed line) which tested the impact of 
different decision variables on drug choice (A-F). The associations illustrate the main conclusions drawn from the exhaustive review of concurrent choice association 
studies listed in Tables 1-3. Dependence severity was associated with preferential drug choice in baseline conditions (A-C), but not with greater sensitivity to a cue- 
induced increase in drug choice (A [14]) as indicated by the lack of interaction between slopes, contradicting cue-reactivity theories of addiction. Similarly, 
dependence severity was not associated with insensitivity to the decrease in drug choice produced by drug devaluation (B [64]) or by imposing costs on the drug 
choice (C [65]), contradicting habit and compulsion theories of addiction, respectively. By contrast, greater sensitivity to negative mood induced increases in drug 
choice was associated with dependence (D [67]) and depression (E [77]), but most reliably with self-reported drug use to cope with negative affect (F [70]). The 
implication is that vulnerability to dependence is conferred by greater relative value ascribed to drugs, and relative drug value is further augmented by negative 
affective states in those who report drug use coping motives. Dependence does not appear to be characterised by abnormal cue-reactivity, habit learning or 
compulsion.. 
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3. Changes in the relative value of drugs versus alternative 
rewards may underpin recovery from addiction 
Many people recover from addiction, often without any formal 
treatment [89] and there are a number of psychological and pharma-
cological treatments for addiction that have demonstrable efficacy 
[90,91]. Any coherent theoretical account of addiction must be able to 
explain how people with addiction are able to recover, and how 
treatments exert their beneficial effects. As recently outlined elsewhere 
[6], behavioural economic accounts that emphasise the centrality of the 
relative valuations of drugs versus competing non-drug reinforcers offer 
a parsimonious account of recovery and the mechanisms of action of 
treatment. These accounts are focussed on non-drug reinforcers that act 
as substitutes rather than complements for drug reinforcement [11,92]. 
The importance of non-drug substitute reinforcers in behavioural eco-
nomic demand and choice has been largely overlooked, although it has 
been recognised in recent human [93] and animal [94] addiction re-
search. In this section we provide a brief overview of the literature on 
behavioural economic factors in recovery from addiction and in the 
mechanisms of action of treatments. 
In humans, recovery from addiction occurs when the availability of 
drug-free rewarding activities increases [6,95–98] and/or when the 
detrimental effects of drug use on health and interpersonal relation-
ships become more salient [99]. Comparable findings have been re-
ported in animal models of drug use and its cessation [34,100]. To our 
knowledge there are no prospective studies that tracked changes in 
behavioural economic demand for the drug or changes in the valuation 
of drug versus non-drug rewards during unassisted recovery from ad-
diction. However in a recent cross-sectional study we demonstrated that 
individual differences in “meaning in life” (which might loosely cor-
respond to valuations attached to non-drug activities) were negatively 
associated with scores on the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test, 
and this association was partially mediated by indices of behavioural 
economic demand for alcohol derived from the Alcohol Purchase Task 
[101]. Longitudinal studies are required to investigate if unassisted 
resolution of drinking problems and “maturing out” of alcohol use 
disorders and other addictions are accompanied by and mediated by 
changes in economic demand for the drug and the relative valuation of 
the drug versus competing reinforcers. 
Regarding the mechanisms of action of established treatments for 
addiction, some studies have implicated changes in behavioural eco-
nomic demand as important mediators of the effects of a variety of 
psychological interventions on drug use outcomes. For example, brief 
motivational interventions and pharmacotherapy prompted changes in 
behavioural economic demand for the drug, and these changes in turn 
predicted the likelihood of sustained changes in drug use after receiving 
the treatment [102,103]. Another study found that shifts in the pro-
portionate reinforcement derived from drug use versus drug-free ac-
tivities accounted for the effects of a motivational intervention on al-
cohol dependence [104]. In a recent paper [6] we argued that changes 
in the relative valuation of drugs versus drug-free alternatives (beha-
vioural economic substitutes) may mediate the beneficial effects of di-
verse interventions on drug use. For example, mindfulness techniques 
that train people to ‘savour’ experiences associated with substance-free 
activities in their lives may increase the value attributed to substance- 
free alternatives [105]. Another example relates to the changes in social 
networks that are associated with involvement in Alcoholics’ Anon-
ymous, in which people in recovery distance themselves from heavy 
drinkers in their social networks and replace them with other people 
who are also in recovery, which should in principle shift the relative 
valuation of alcohol versus alcohol-free alternative activities [106]. To 
give another example, cognitive behavior therapy may partially exert 
its beneficial effects because it encourages people with addiction to 
think about how their drinking is hurting family members (thereby 
devaluing alcohol), and counterconditioning exercises may increase the 
valuation of substance-free alternatives [107]. 
The effectiveness of contingency management and related inter-
ventions provides more direct evidence that changing the valuation of 
drugs versus drug-free alternatives plays an important role in the suc-
cessful treatment of addiction. Contingency management approaches 
offer financial incentives to people with addiction if they can confirm 
their abstinence from drugs, which should in principle devalue the drug 
whilst increasing the value of drug-free activities that the financial in-
centives can be used to obtain. These approaches lead to reductions in 
drug use [108] that may be mediated by the extent to which they re-
balance the relative value of drug use versus drug-free alternative be-
haviours [109,110]. More recently studied interventions include be-
havioural activation and substance-free activity sessions that aim to 
increase the availability and value of drug-free activities, thereby in-
directly reducing the relative value of drugs. These interventions lead to 
reductions in drug use that may be mediated by increases in engage-
ment in drug-free activities [104,111,112]. A speculative interpretation 
of these findings is that shifts in the relative valuation of drugs versus 
competing reinforcers may underlie these effects, an interpretation that 
could be evaluated in future studies of the mediators of behavior 
change after these types of treatments [113]. 
In this section we have outlined how changes in valuations of drugs 
and drug-free alternatives may at least partially account for how diverse 
treatments for addiction exert their therapeutic effects, and how people 
recover from addiction. We acknowledge that this is speculative, and 
further work with validated measures of valuation (such as the con-
current choice and alcohol purchase tasks) is needed to confirm and 
build on these findings. We also acknowledge that our focus on the 
centrality of valuation processes may appear to overlook other aspects 
of addiction treatment and recovery such as self-efficacy and the ac-
quisition of coping skills that may play an important role in the va-
luation processes. These important constructs may be reconciled with a 
valuation-based account if one considers the internal mechanics of 
value-based decision-making. We describe computational work on 
value-based decision-making in the next section. 
4. The internal mechanisms that underpin value-based decisions, 
and distortion of those mechanisms in addiction 
Concurrent choice tasks in which participants choose between a 
drug versus alternative reward have contributed important information 
about the role of decision making in addiction [7,114]. However, this 
task leaves some uncertainties regarding the internal processes that 
precede and determine overt choice. Computational models of value- 
based decision making help characterise the accumulation of evidence 
prior to a choice being made – and how this process might be distorted 
in addiction. More specifically, a focus on the internal machinery of 
value-based decision-making may enable a unified decision theory that 
can account for how drug related cues, devaluation, imposition of costs 
and negative mood induction might influence overt behavior through a 
common mechanism. 
Experimental procedures for assessing value-based decision-making 
(VBDM) are similar to those used in the concurrent choice tasks de-
scribed above: Participants must choose between two pictures that 
depict valued outcomes. However, there are a number of important 
differences. Firstly, in VBDM procedures participants initially view a 
battery of images and they are asked to report the degree to which they 
would most like to consume or experience each one – this is important 
for rank ordering the images in each category from least to most valued 
[115]. If VBDM procedures were to be applied to the study of addiction, 
this initial subjective rating phase would be done separately for drug 
images (e.g. pictures of different alcoholic drinks, or scenarios that 
involve drinking alcohol) and non-drug images (e.g. images that depict 
valued objects or activities that do not involve alcohol, such as 
spending time with one’s children, engaging in hobbies or sport, etc.). 
After participants provide these ratings, they complete a concurrent 
choice task in which either two drug-related images or two non-drug 
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images are presented side-by-side, and participants must select their 
preferred option as quickly as possible. The initial picture ratings are 
important because these are used to determine pairs of images that are 
presented on each trial: some trials might be relatively ‘easy’ for par-
ticipants (for example, if they have to choose between a highly pre-
ferred and a least preferred image), whereas other trials might be more 
difficult for participants (for example if they have to choose between 
two images that were both rated similarly during the initial rating task). 
It is also important to note that, unlike the concurrent choice task de-
scribed above, participants are never asked to choose between drug and 
non-drug options: instead, VBDM parameters must be extracted sepa-
rately from drug picture and non-drug picture blocks. 
Participants’ reaction time and ‘error’ data (with errors inferred if 
participants’ selections during the choice task are inconsistent with 
their stated preferences during the initial rating task) are then fitted 
using drift diffusion models [116,117]. These models operate on the 
basic assumption that, when faced with a particular choice set (e.g. 
between two images that depict drug outcomes), internal evidence for 
each possible outcome accumulates over time until the accumulated 
evidence for one crosses a response or decision boundary. Evidence (or 
value) accumulation is noisy, which determines the frequency of errors 
that participants make, along with the characteristic distribution of 
reaction times. Fitting of drift diffusion models to participants’ reaction 
time and error data enables the recovery of distinct parameters that 
underlie value-based choice. These parameters include the rate of evi-
dence (or value) accumulation for the category of stimuli that are 
presented during the task (for example, pictures depicting the partici-
pants’ drug of choice, or pictures that depict drug-free rewards) and the 
decision-maker’s response threshold when they are making choices 
between images that belong to that particular category. 
According to a recent conceptual model [6,118] these VBDM 
models can be applied to account for addiction in general, and for 
performance on classic concurrent choice tasks [119] as follows. Firstly, 
consider how people would be expected to perform on a VBDM task 
with alcohol-related images. On this task, the person with alcohol de-
pendence should have a higher rate of evidence accumulation and a 
lower response threshold, compared to a person who drinks infre-
quently and is not dependent on it. By contrast, if those same two in-
dividuals were to perform a VBDM task with images that depict non- 
drug rewarding activities (for example, going for a walk in the coun-
tryside), we would expect to see the opposite pattern: a higher rate of 
evidence accumulation and a lower response threshold in the person 
who drinks alcohol infrequently and is not dependent, compared to the 
person who is dependent on alcohol. In this way, the VBDM task has the 
potential to isolate drug hypervaluation and alternative reward hypo-
valuation, unlike the concurrent choice task which conflates these two 
processes. However, the VBDM task lacks a direct comparison of drug 
versus alternative rewards, which may be important to isolate the core 
dysfunction in addiction. Perhaps then, the best evidence on the role of 
VBDM in addiction would come from a convergence of both types of 
task. 
Application of VBDM as a tool to explain vulnerability to addiction 
and recovery from it can be used to identify novel hypotheses regarding 
the mechanisms through which some people are particularly vulnerable 
to addiction, and how they eventually recover. Regarding vulnerability 
to addiction, prospective studies could investigate if future dependence 
severity is best predicted by elevated evidence accumulation for the 
drug, suppressed evidence accumulation for non-drug alternatives, a 
low response threshold when evaluating drug options, an elevated re-
sponse threshold when evaluating non-drug options, or if each of these 
parameters is equally predictive of dependence in the future. We also 
noted earlier that coping motives are associated with increased sensi-
tivity to negative mood induction raising the expected relative value of 
the drug, augmenting goal-directed drug choice. It would be interesting 
to test whether this mood induction effect was due to elevated evidence 
accumulation for the drug, suppressed evidence accumulation for non- 
drug alternatives, a low response threshold when evaluating drug op-
tions, and / or an elevated response threshold when evaluating non- 
drug options. Similarly, future work could investigate whether the 
impact of other experimental manipulations, including the presentation 
of drug cues in the PIT task, drug devaluation, and the imposition of 
costs on the drug choice, can be explained by changes in evidence ac-
cumulation rates or response thresholds for the drug versus alternative 
reward. 
Regarding recovery from addiction, in our recent paper we outlined 
the changes to VBDM parameters that we would expect to see as people 
receive treatment for addiction and recovery [6]. For example, inter-
ventions such as behavioural activation [111] that aim to directly in-
crease the value of drug-free activities should exert their beneficial 
effects on drug use because they amplify the rate of evidence accu-
mulation when participants are choosing between two valued drug-free 
alternatives, but this intervention should have no effect on the rate of 
evidence accumulation when participants are choosing between two 
drug alternatives. By contrast, a pharmacological intervention such as 
nicotine replacement therapy [120] would be expected to selectively 
suppress the rate of evidence accumulation when participants are 
choosing between two drug alternatives. Finally, elements of mind-
fulness interventions that focus on “acceptance of uncomfortable states 
or challenging situations without reacting automatically” [121] might 
exert their beneficial effects by raising the person’s response threshold 
when they are faced with an opportunity to use the drug, which might 
be sufficient for them to resist drug use on that occasion. Such appli-
cation of VBDM tasks to understand addiction, its treatment, and re-
covery is speculative and awaits empirical testing. 
5. Summary and conclusion 
We started with the premise of behavioural economic theory of 
addiction, that greater expected value of drug relative to alternative 
non-drug rewards is the core mechanism underpinning vulnerability to 
and recovery from addiction. We evaluated this claim by reviewing 
human concurrent choice studies with drug users, which showed that 
dependence severity was reliably associated with overall drug pre-
ference, and self-reported drug use to cope with negative affect was 
reliably associated with greater sensitivity to mood induced increases in 
drug choice, suggesting these two risk pathways underpin addiction. By 
contrast, addiction severity was not consistently associated with sen-
sitivity to the effect of drug cues, drug devaluation or punishment on 
drug choice, an observation which contradicts cue-reactivity, habit and 
compulsion theories of addiction. We then described evidence that 
therapeutic interventions and recovery from addiction might be at-
tributed to changes in the expected relative value of drug versus al-
ternative rewards. In the final section, we outlined a speculative com-
putational model and novel experimental method that could be used to 
probe accumulation of evidence about drugs and alternative rewards 
that could drive action selection. Combining the standard concurrent 
choice paradigm and these new computational approaches will be 
fruitful areas for future research, improving the understanding and 
treatment of addiction. 
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